Abstract-Targeted online advertising elicits a potential threat. A commercial agent has a chance to mitigate the visibility of his opponents because their sales or services are of similar types. In this paper, we consider the competition for attention in popular online social networks (OSNs) that usually employ a timelinebased homepage to sort messages chronologically in a limited visible region. A non-cooperative Tullock-like game model is formulated that consists of a finite amount of benign agents and one malicious agent. By paying to the OSN, each benign agent seeks to maximize his utility of visibility, while the malicious one aims to reduce the utilities of benign agents. Our primary purposes are to quantify how robust the overall performance of benign agents is against the malicious action, and how the OSN's revenue is influenced. We derive the upper and the lower bounds of six fundamental measures with regard to the total utility and the total net utility of benign agents and the OSN's revenue under three different scenarios: with and without the malicious agent, and the maximum. They capture the worst and the best performances of the benign agents as well as the OSN. Our study reveals two important insights: i) the performance bounds are very sensitive to the malicious agent's willingness to pay at certain ranges; ii) the OSN acquires more revenues from this malicious action.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to intensive and massive user engagements, Online social networks (OSNs) have attracted a lot of companies and organizations (defined as 'agents'' uniformly) to do online advertising so as to gain visibility from users. The major OSNs such as Facebook, Twitter, Renren et al. adopt a timelinebased template in their homepages to sort content in which it is referred to as News Feed in Facebook and as Timeline in Twitter. We use the term "timeline" throughout this work. There are two classical ways to place commercial content on the timelines of users. One is to display them to all the viewers in a reverse chronological order. Aged content will be flushed down by newcomers automatically. An agent can return to the top of the timeline if he sends a new content again. The other is to display content to a fraction of targeted viewers for each agent. Those who pay more to the OSN may receive larger shares of viewers' attention in a certain duration.
The dissemination of commercial content on a timeline possesses three interesting features. Firstly, the visibility ( visibile duration) of a content is finite. In a reverse chronological timeline, old content are swept away by new content, thus losing its visibility. Though technically a viewer can scroll through a very large number of posts, recent eye-tracking experiment has confirmed that the attention of viewers is focused on the first several entries [1] . When multiple agents send content to the timeline, an agent can gain more visibility via sending messages faster. Hence, a natural competition arises among these agents. In a periodically changing timeline, OSNs can take down content of agents after a fixed time interval, which also throttles their visibility. Secondly, targeted advertising, though delivering content to preferred viewers effectively, induces a new type of malicious behavior. OSNs offer an unprecedented way of advertising by mining the rich data (e.g. posts and profiles) about their users. With targeted advertising, the agents competing for visibility may promote the sales of similar products or services, e.g. they are all dealers of articles for babies. Hence, an established agent in the market can utilize this opportunity to mitigate the visibility of his opponents. While in the absence of targeted advertising, he has no incentive to diminish the visibility of agents who are usually not of the same type. Meanwhile, the coessential agents (e.g. restaurants) are usually located in the same geographical region (e.g. shopping mall or streets) due to the famous "Hotelling's Law" [2] . When they compete for visibility in location based mobile social networks, an established agent can play the role of the malicious advertiser. Last but not the least, the agents possess heterogeneous utilities toward visibility on the timeline. The same level of visibility may bring different utilities to different agents. The utility of an agent has quite a few interpretations. For instance, the agent's utility corresponds to monetary return if it is promoting the sale of certain products, and to the satisfaction from viewer's attention if it is spreading the publicity of news. This heterogeneity significantly increases the difficulty to understand the competition for visibility.
In this paper, we model the timeline competition as a noncooperative game where the players consist of a finite number of benign agents and one malicious agent. The strategy of a player is his rate to post messages to the timeline. To capture the visibility of an agent, we build three practical metrics, mean number of messages, fraction of visible time and fraction of viewers. Interestingly, these different metrics are found to be functions of the ratio that an agent's sending rate is divided by the aggregate rate of all the agents. This rate proportional sharing rule bears the similar form as the Tullock or Lottery contest in economic literature and the Kelly mechanism in communication networks [3] . All the agents make payments to the OSN in proportion to their sending rates. The advent of targeted advertising breeds a new threat to OSNs. A benign agent only expects to acquire more publicity to their products or services, considering the cost of sending messages. While the malicious agent is usually an established brand or organization. His utility is not hailing from his visibility on the timeline, but from the utility losses of all the benign agents. The hostility of the malicious agent is captured by his willingness to pay or willingness factor. The willingness factor refers to a scalar that the malicious agent wishes to use unit cost to trade for the loss of aggregate utility of the benign agents. Hence, his objective is to minimize the total utility of benign agents minus the payment to the OSN.
In our timeline competition game, the benign agents are usually heterogeneous in their utilities for a given visibility. Meanwhile, the willingness factor of the malicious agent varies in different contexts. Therefore, it is much more meaningful to understand their general impacts on the Nash equilibrium (NE) than to solve the NE in each individual case. We are faced with the following fundamental question: To what extent can the malicious agent mitigate the utility and the net utility of benign agents, and influence the revenue of the OSN on the timeline? To answer this question, we analyze the total utility U and the total net utility V of the benign agents and the total revenue of the OSN W under three scenarios: i) NE of the game excluding the malicious agent (nom), ii) NE of the game consisting of the malicious agent (mal), iii) the maximum measures excluding the malicious agent (max). We compare the above performance measures in different scenarios via their upper and lower bounds. The bounds of Wnom demonstrate the best and the worst changes of performance measures between the two NEs excluding and including the malicious agent. Our study reveals two interesting phenomena: the willingness factor of the malicious agent in certain ranges can remarkably reduce the upper and the lower bounds of the benign agents' total utility and total net utility; the OSN obtains better revenue from the malicious action against targeted advertising. In addition, given a fixed number of players on the timeline, a more accurate targeted advertising generates better revenues to the OSN and improves the net utility of the malicious agent, while reducing the utility and the net utility of the benign agents.
We summarize our main results and contributions as follows.
1) We formulate the timeline competition with targeted advertising as a non-cooperative game. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to assess the impact of potential malicious actions against the timeline advertising.
2) For general utility functions, we quantify the lower bounds of Vnom that are jointly determined by the number of benign agents (N ) and the willingness factor (θ).
3) For linear utility functions,
Umax has the upper bound Wnom is lower bounded by 1 and its upper bound is ∞.
5) We generalize our model to the imperfect targeted advertising. The sending rate of the malicious agent increases, and the utility and the net utility of benign agents increase as the targeted advertising loses its accuracy.
Theoretically speaking, the Tullock contest possesses a variety of applications, and resembles Kelly's mechanism [4] in bandwidth allocation problems. Johari and Tsitsiklis's fundamental study announced that the maximum loss of the aggregate utility is bounded to be 1/4 due to the selfishness of users. However, they did not consider other important measures beside the aggregate utility such as the aggregate net utility. The bound of efficiency loss with a finite number of users is overlooked, which is very important in new networking applications. Our game model is mathematically the same as the one in [5] that introduces a malicious user, while the authors mainly focused on the bound of efficiency loss in the aggregate utility and the asymptotic bound. Meanwhile, only the lower bounds are investigated in which the computation of upper bounds are left open. Resolving the above theoretic problems is very challenging and a set of new approaches are indispensable. On the basis of the seminal studies by [3] and [5] , we systematically derive the efficiency losses from three important aspects: multiple essential measures for the efficiency, the regime of finite number of competitors, and the upper bounds.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II formulates the mathematical model of timeline competition and performance measures. In section III we present the upper and lower bounds of different measures on the efficiency losses of benign agents. Section IV investigates the impact of the malicious agent's action on the revenue of OSN. Numerical results are given in section V to validate the accuracy of our theoretic bounds. Section VI discusses the general application and related extensions, and section VII concludes this work.
A. Related Work
We describe the closely related works from three perspectives and summarize our major differences from the literature.
Timeline Competition: An important feature is that popular OSNs such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter adopt a timeline-based template to sort content reverse chronologically. [6] first studied the competition between different content creators on a user's timeline. The timeline competition is modeled as a non-cooperative game in [7] that is in the standard form of Kelly mechanism. They further extended the Kelly mechanism to the parallel competition on multiple topics in a timeline [8] . Fully dynamic and semi-dynamic models have been proposed in [9] and [10] respectively to characterize the competition on followers' timeline over time.
Contest Theory: In politics and economics, there are many situations where agents fight over property rights. The kernel feature of a contest is the contest success function (CSF) developed from the seminal work by Tullock [11] , [12] . Rent-seeking, a specific contest, was studied in [13] and a lobbying contest was studied in [14] . The Tullock CSF is the special case of our timeline competition model when the utility functions are all linear and the malicious agent does not exist. More recently, the studies on CSF mainly focus on the equilibrium analysis with incomplete information [15] , [16] and the design of CSF mechanism [17] , [18] .
Bandwidth Allocation Games: F.P. Kelly proposed a market mechanism in which each user submits a "bid" per unit time to the network operator, and the network operator determines the share of each user at a link [4] . In particular, the bandwidth share is proportional to his bid and inversely proportional to the sum of all users' bids at a single link. Johari and Tsitsiklis [3] found that under Kelly's mechanism, the selfish behavior of the users lead to an aggregate utility that is no worse than 3/4 of the maximum possible aggregate utility. A "malicious" player was introduced in the Kelly mechanism to study the lower bound of the total utility of benign users at an infinite population regime [5] . Other important works studied the performance of market equilibriums and the convergence of best response dynamics when players compete on multiple servers or links simultaneously [19] , [20] .
Brief Summary: Our study differs from the literature on timeline competition and contest theory in two aspects: i) we consider the presence of a malicious agent in particular for targeted advertising, while all the agents are assumed to be selfish in the existing works; ii) we study the worst and the best performance of the contest with heterogeneous agents that have not been considered before. Our study distinguishes from the literature on bandwidth allocation games in three aspects: iii) we consider finite number of agents; iv) three different performance measures are compared and v) both the lower and (some) upper bounds are investigated.
II. MODEL AND MEASURES
In this section, we present three practical metrics to quantify the visibility of content and propose a novel game model to capture the adversarial competition for viewers' attention.
A. Practical Metrics
We consider the competition of visibility in an OSN that use a timeline-based template to sort messages in a reverse chronological order. An agent is able to post messages to the timeline of targeted viewers at the cost of monetary payment to the OSN. In fact, a mobile screen or a desktop can display a very finite number of commercial messages. The newly arrived messages are likely to flush away the old ones. A natural competition arises when multiple agents use this timeline for commercial promotions or advertising campaigns. Fig.1 illustrates such a competition on a timeline that can display at most K messages. We suppose that there exist N +1 agents denoted by A={A 0 , A 1 , · · ·, A N }. Each agent sends messages with a mean rate denoted by x i for all A i ∈A. Denote by x the vector of mean arrival rates. The messages outside of the first K cannot receive any attention. To solicit our analytical model, we examine three concrete performance metrics with regard to the viewers' attention, denoted by M(x).
Fig. 1. Illustration of Timeline Competition
Metric 1 -Mean Number of Messages: Each agent cares about the average number of messages belong to him on the visible timeline. To be noted, we do not assume the restrictive Poisson arrival of messages. We use the definition of Palm probability which is the probability seen at an arrival instant. Consider the message arrival to the timeline that is captured by a superposition of N +1 stationary ergodic point process.
Each point process has a finite and positive intensity x i for i = 0, 1, · · · , N . Let p i (·) be the Palm probability of the ergodic point process that corresponds to point process for agent A i . According to [6] and [7] , the Palm probability is given by
This means that at an arrival instant, a displayed message is send by agent A i with probability p i (x). Then, the mean number of messages on the timeline that belong to A i is given by M i (x) = Kx i /z. Metric 2 -Fraction of Visible Time: Each agent is interested in the fraction of time that his messages can be found in a viewer's timeline. The message delivery of A i follows a Poisson process with the rate x i for all A i ∈ A. Hence, the timeline can be modeled as a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) with K states. Each state represents a vector of messages occupying the k th visible position. Similarly, according to [7] , the fraction of time that A i 's messages can be seen in the timeline is This feature is significant in that we are able to explore the general properties of timeline competition. Furthermore, if the metrics are linear to xi z , the timeline competition is equivalent to standard Tullock mechanism in economics and Kelly mechanism in resource allocation.
B. Basic Model
We distinguish N +1 agents into two groups where those in the set {A 1 , · · · , A N } are benign and A 0 is malicious. Every benign agent wants to utilize the timeline to gain visibility by paying for commercial messages. His purpose is to achieve an optimal tradeoff between his utility through OSN advertising and the cost of message delivery. On the contrary, the malicious agent, instead of caring about his own visibility, aims to mitigate the benefit of timeline advertising of other benign agents. This adversarial timeline competition is feasible when the malicious agent and the benign agents are promoting the sales of similar products or services, or disseminating similar types of messages.
The targeted online advertising has turned the adversarial timeline competition into reality. There are two representative ways to perform targeted advertising. One is to recommend potential viewers to the agents by mining the viewer behaviors from history data or by infringing the privacy of viewers. For instance, the OSN provider can infer the needs of timeline viewers based on their posts, and then deliver advertisements to the timeline of selected viewers. The other is through topic classification, in which the viewers in each topic (e.g. infant, tourism) possess the same preference of purchases. In our context, timeline advertising on social media is less expensive than traditional media (e.g. TV, newspaper, etc.) to gain attentions for smaller companies or new comers. A 0 usually plays the role of an established company who aims to prohibit his competitors from utilizing social media advertising. Utility Model: We hereby model utilities of all the agents. Recall that x={x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x N } are a vector of mean arrival rates of messages to the timeline. Let d i = xi z be the fraction of A i 's arrival rate over the total arrival rate, and let d={d 0 , d 1 , · · ·, d N } be the corresponding vector. Denote by U Ai (d i ) the utility of A i on the timeline, given the fraction of attention d i . The cost of sending a message is denoted by c in which we assume the unit price (i.e. c:=1) if not mentioned explicitly. The net utility of a benign agent A i , V Ai (x), is defined as the difference between the utility and the cost,
If U Ai is interpreted as money, then V Ai is actually the profit; if U Ai reflects A i 's satisfaction from viewers' attention, V Ai may not refer to the profit, but the net gain of performing timeline advertising. Similar to the assumptions made in prior works on network resource allocation [3] and [5] , we employ the following assumption on the utility of benign agents.
strictly concave, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in x i , and is strictly convex and strictly decreasing in x j for all i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0 and j = i. The objective of the malicious agent is to neutralize the utilities of all other benign agents. Hence, the net utility of A 0 is expressed as
where θ > 0 is the willingness to pay (or willingness factor) of the malicious agent. Note that θ captures A 0 's resolution to reduce the total utilities of benign agents. At an extreme point θ = 0, A 0 does not participate in the timeline competition in any situation, while at the other extreme point θ → ∞, A 0 creates messages with an infinite intensity to flush away those of all the benign agents. Or the malicious agent pays as much as possible to the OSN so to occupy all the visible space of the timeline. A similar utility model has been proposed initially to characterize Internet Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack in [5] . However, the metrics to evaluate the outcome of DDoS attack/defence can hardly be taken for our timeline competition. Our major differences will be elaborated at the end of this section. Remark 2: If we assume that A 0 wants to neutralize the net utility of benign agents, it is equivalent since by adding to V A0 the costs of benign agents that does not depend on A 0 . Game Model: We formulate the competition of viewers' eyeballs as a noncooperative game denoted by G that comprises three key elements: -Players: a set of advertising agents {A 0 , A 1 , · · · , A N }; -Strategies: each player's strategy is the intensity of sending messages, i.e. x i for all i = 0, 1, · · · , N ; -Payoffs: the payoff of a player is his net utility, i.e.
For the game G, we define its Nash Equilibrium (NE) as the following.
Definition 1: (Nash Equilibrium) Let x = (x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x N ) be the set of feasible arrival rates of advertisers, and
We further define a special type of utility function. Definition 2: (Linear Utility Function) The utility of benign agent A i is a linear function if it is in the form
where v i is regarded as A i 's valuation on the visibility of the whole timeline. The valuations are sorted in a decreasing order, i.e. v 1 ≥v 2 ≥ · · · ≥v N with v 1 normalized as 1.
C. Performance Measures
We define three measures to quantify the outcomes of timeline competition: total utility (U) and total net utility (V) of benign agents as well as total OSN revenue (W). Formally, there
where c is taken as 1 without loss of generality. Here, U and V are pertinent to the benefits of timeline advertising reaped by the benign agents, and W reflects the benefit obtained by the OSN. It is noteworthy that W may contain the payment from the malicious agent if it is included. The competitions take place among the benign agents, and between the benign agents and the malicious agent. They are expected to reduce the utility and the net utility of the benign agents, and affect the revenue of the OSN. To capture the efficiency of the malicious agent to neutralize the gains of the benign agents and his impact on the OSN's revenue, we compare U (resp. V and W) in three scenarios: MAL, NOM and MAX. Here, MAL is the game consisting of all the players in A; NOM is the game excluding the malicious agent A 0 ; MAX refers to the optimal measures (i.e. aggregate utility and aggregate net utility of benign agents, and OSN's total revenue) when excluding the malicious agent A 0 . In general, the utility functions of the benign agents are rather diverse; one has to investigate enormous cases so to understand the impact of malicious behavior on the performance measures. In stead of pursuing case-by-case studies, we resort to the worst and the best performance for versatile utility functions. Therefore, our primary goals are to quantify the following bounds:
• B1:
Umax , the gap between the total utility (or satisfaction) at the NE of MAL and the maximum total utility (or satisfaction) of benign agents.
• B2:
Unom , the damage to the total utility (or satisfaction) of benign agents at two NEs of MAL and NOM respectively.
• B3:
Vmax , the dissipation of total net utility of benign agents at the NE of MAL in comparison to the maximum total net utility of benign agents.
• B4:
Vnom , the damage to the total net utility of benign agents at two NEs of MAL and NOM respectively.
• B5:
Wmax , the ratio between the OSN's revenue at the NE of MAL and the maximum revenue of the OSN in the game MAL. It can be larger than 1.
• B6:
Wnom , the ratio between the OSN's revenue at the NE of MAL and that at the NE of NOM. It can be larger than 1. The bounds B1, B3 and B5 mainly capture the absolute performance at the NE with the possible emergence of the malicious agent (compared with the maximum performance free of the malicious agent). While the bounds B2, B4 and B6 look into the relative changes brought by the possible emergence of the malicious agent.
In the seminal work [5] , the total utility of benign users is the main concern. The lower bound of
Umax has been analyzed in the extreme with unlimited number of players. In comparison, our novel features are highlighted as below.
i) : We consider a more challenging setting, i.e. finite number of the benign agents, such that existing methodologies in [3] and [5] to find the bounds do not apply in general;
ii): The bounds B2∼B6 have not been studied previously. iii): In addition to the lower bounds, we further obtain the upper bounds to exhibit the best performance measures for benchmark linear utility functions; iv): We study the bounds of OSN's revenue on the timeline; v): We extend our model to the situation of imperfect targeted advertising.
III. EFFICIENCY LOSS OF BENIGN AGENTS
In this section, we obtain the bounds of performance measures for timeline competition. Our analyses provide deep understandings on how (in)efficient the malicious agent can neutralize the benefits of the benign agents.
A. Nash Equilibrium
We first echo that the timeline game G induces a unique Nash equilibrium. The uniqueness has been proved in Kelly's mechanism (price anticipating bandwidth sharing game) with only benign users [3] , and in the DDoS attack game [5] . Here, a couple of known results are summarized.
Theorem 1: (Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium)[5]
The game G has a unique Nash Equilibrium x≥0 under assumption P1, where at least two components of x are positive. Remark 3: The condition for unique NE in the price anticipating bandwidth sharing game [3] is less stronger that that of our timeline competition and the DDoS attack game [5] . The former only requires that U i (d i ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in d i , while the latter requires P1.
The above theorem also implies that a subset of agents may not send messages to the timeline. We claim that A i does not participate in the competition if x * i = 0 at the NE. In the standard Kelly's mechanism, at least two players participate at the NE. This is also true in the timeline competition with the specialty that these two players can be one benign agent and the malicious agent. Let us first examine the participation of players at the NE. Solving the best response for each player, we obtain the NE optimality conditions (denoted as NE CONDs).
NE CONDs in Eqs. (4) and (5) do not yield close-form expression of the NE, thus not allowing further understanding on its property. Remark 4: If multiple malicious agents with different willingness factors coexist, NE CONDs manifest that only the one with the largest willingness factor participates in the timeline competition. This mathematically justifies why we only need to consider a single malicious agent.
Here, we compute the NE when the utilities of the benign agents are linear functions of the viewers' attention. Our purpose is to scrutinize the participation of players on top of an explicit-form NE. Based on the NE CONDs, we hereby present a method to search the explicit NE within N steps. The first step is to compute x * by assuming the participation of n=N benign agents at the NE. If x * i is positive for all A i ∈A, the NE is obtained. Otherwise, if any x * i is negative, this means that some of the benign agents or the malicious agent do not participate in the timeline competition. By removing the concurrent benign agent with the smallest valuation or the malicious agent, we proceed to search until n=1. For any n benign agents at the NE, x * i is given by
if there exists θ < n−1 n j=1 vj n j=1 1/vj −n(n−1) . Then, all the participants are benign agents. Otherwise, there has   
if θ is no less than the above threshold. Here, the malicious agent participates in the timeline competition. We further present general properties w.r.t. the participation of the benign agents when the utilities are linear to their viewers' attention.
Theorem 2: (Participation of Players for Linear Utility)
The NE x * has the following properties:
All the proofs can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 2 shows the conditions that the benign agents or the malicious agent to post messages. When θ is larger than a fixed threshold, A 0 will always send messages to the timeline, regardless of the valuations of benign agents. The second bullet shows that the benign agents with higher valuations are more likely to participate at the NE.
B. Lower Bounds for General Utility Functions
In general, each benign agent has a different utility function w.r.t the viewers' attention. How this heterogeneity may influence the total utility and the total net utility of benign agents remains unknown. It is also vital to understand to what extent the malicious agent can mitigate the benefits of online advertising of the benign ones. For arbitrary utility functions, the exact U, V and W are highly variable without revealing general properties. Hence, we are interested in the bounds of
Vnom under the assumption P1. The analysis of bounds can be retrospected to the seminal work [3] in which the lower bound of Umax as N approaches infinity. The differences between our model and the above seminal works have been highlighted in five aspects (see Section 2.3). Johari and Tsitsiklis [3] showed in Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 4 that the NE U over the social optimal U has a lower bound, and this bound is tight in the case of linear utility functions. Following their approach, we obtain a similar tightness of bound with regard to Vnom resp.) is tight in the case of linear utility functions of the benign agents.
Henceforth, to find the lower bounds of performance measures with heterogeneous valuations, we only need to compute the bounds for benign agents with linear utility functions. The NE of MAL game is given in Eqs. (6) and (7) . Here, we want to answer two questions regarding the arbitrary valuations: i) How can the malicious agent neutralize the total utility of the benign agents, and how can he accelerate the dissipation of their total net utility? ii) When are the lower bounds tight and what are the asymptotic bounds in the regime of infinite number of benign agents? To these goals, we need to compute the NEs in MAL and NOM as well as the maximum measures. The following theorem states the lower bound of
Umax .
Theorem 4: (Lower Bound of Total Utility over Maximum)
Given linear utility functions of the benign agents, the ratio
Umax has the following lower bound
where the equality in the former is reached at v i = 0 for i ≥ 2, and the equality in the latter is reached at
The asymptotic bound of
has been proved in [5] as the following.
Lemma 1: [5] As N → ∞, the asymptotic lower bound is
where 3/4 is reached at v i = 1/2 for i ≥ 2.
Remark 5: The lower bound of
Umax consists of two cases. When θ is greater than a certain threshold, the utility loss of benign agents is governed by θ. The larger θ is, the smaller bound of efficiency loss will be. In this situation, the bound is tight when only the benign agent with the highest valuation and the malicious one battle on the timeline. When the willingness factor is below that threshold, the efficiency loss is completely caused by the competition among benign agents. The bound is tight when all the benign agents except A 1 have the identical valuation asymptotically approaching The asymptotic lower bound for N → ∞ has been proved in [5] that uses a different approach introduced by [3] .
We proceed to compare the total utilities at two NEs of the games MAL and NOM. In the latter, the efficiency loss is caused by the competition among benign agents, while in former, the possible participation of the malicious agent may aggravate the efficiency loss. Unom has the following lower bound
where it is tight for any v 2 ≤ θ 1+θ . Remark 6: Even though θ is small, the malicious agent can still nuetralize the total utility of benign agents in the worst case. As θ increases, the utility loss grows accordingly. The lower bound is not influenced by the number of benign agents.
The net utility reflects the gain of a benign agent performing advertising on the timeline. When the net utility is small, it may have less incentive to send messages so to gain viewer's attention. The competition among all the agents results in the dissipation of the gains of benign agents. It is crucial to capture to what extent the presence of the malicious agent accelerates the dissipation of the total net utility.
Theorem 6: (Lower Bound of Total Net Utility over Maximum) Define a variableṽ
(n) that is the unique positive and real solution to the equality
for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N }. The lower bound of the total net utility is given by (12) . Vnom has the following lower bound
Remark 8: When the timeline competition consists of the malicious agent, a slight increase of the willingness factor can result in a remarkable drop in the total net utility, compared with that excluding the malicious agent.
C. Upper Bounds for Linear Utility Functions
The upper bounds of the measures are crucial to evaluate the efficiency of timeline competition. On one hand, they characterize the best performance of benign agents when competing not only among themselves, but also with the malicious agent. On the other hand, the upper bounds exhibit the worst achievable damage caused by the malicious agent when he intends to send messages to the timeline. Unfortunately, they have not been studied in the literature. We proceed to investigate if these upper bounds can be quantified.
Since there does not exist a theorem to offer upper bounds of performance measures for general utility functions, we resort to those for linear utility functions. Note that linear utility is a benchmark utility model in contest theory, and corresponds to the metrics such as the mean number of messages and the fraction of viewers in our timeline competition. The following theorem states the upper bound of
Theorem 8: (Upper Bound of Total Utility Over Maximum)
Umax is upper bounded by
The upper bound is achieved when v i equals to 1 for all i. Remark 9: When the willingness factor is less that the threshold that it must participate, the maximum total utility of the benign agents is still achievable. However, when the willingness further increases, even a small increment can give rise to remarkable reduction in the total utility. As N approaches infinity, the asymptotic upper bound is inversely proportional to the willingness factor. We next compare the NEs of MAL and NOM to observe how the intervention of the malicious agent changes the total utility of benign agents. Unom is approximated by
where it is tight for any v 2 ≤ θ 1+θ . Remark 10: The exact upper bound of
Unom does not yield an explicit form. We pick up two extreme cases. One is that the willingness factor is slightly greater than N −1 N . We find the scenario to obtain the best U mal and compare it with the corresponding U nom . The other is that the willingness factor is large. We find the condition to obtain the worst U nom and compare it with the corresponding U mal . The upper bound of 
Remark 11: This theorem manifests that the maximum achievable net utility of the benign agents is very sensitive to the willingness factor. A slight increase of θ can result in an outstanding reduction of the upper bound. An interesting observation is that there is a plateau for θ ∈ [ √ 2−1, 1/2], which means that the malicious agent does not participate at the NE.
IV. REVENUE OF THE OSN AND IMPERFECT TARGETED ADVERTISING In this section, we first study the bounds of the OSN's revenue. We then extend our study to consider the efficiency of imperfect targeted advertising.
A. Bounds of OSN's Revenue with Linear Utility Functions
We have analyzed the best and the worst bounds w.r.t. the total utility and the total net utility of benign agents. However, it is unclear how the malicious agent's action influences the revenue of the OSN. In what follows, we compute the bounds of gains that the malicious agent brings to the OSN with linear utilities of benign agents. 
Remark 13: This theorem manifests that the OSN can always harvest more revenues when the malicious agent sends messages to the timeline. Especially, the participation of the malicious agent brings an unbounded gain in comparison to the competition excluding the malicious agent. We want to know if the OSN can reap a higher revenue by charging the agents a higher price. The optimal pricing on the timeline does not yield an explicit solution in general. Thus, we limit our study to the case with linear utility functions of benign agents. When c is not 1, the NE is also given by Eq. (6) and (7) except that v i is substituted by vi c . We have an interesting corollary directly from Eq.(6) and (7).
Corollary 2: Given linear utility functions of benign agents, the sending rate at the NE decreases with c, while the OSN's revenue is not influenced by any positive c. Thus, the OSN cannot gain more revenue by charging a higher price to the agents with linear utility functions, even though they have diverse valuations.
B. Imperfect Targeted Advertising
In this subsection, we extend to consider the efficiency loss caused by the malicious agent when targeted advertising is imperfect. Then, NOT all the benign agents are promoting the sales of similar products or services to the viewers. As a result, the malicious agent only "battle" against a subset benign agents denoted byÃ withÃ ⊆ A. We definite a vector of indicators {I i } that have
If 
The malicious agent aims to reduce the total utility of M selfish advertisers with M ≤ N . We only present our observations since the computation is direct. i) Participation: All the benign agents will participate in the competition, and the threshold of A 0 's participation is given by θ > N −1 M . This manifests that more "enemies" reduce the participation threshold of the malicious agent.
ii
iii) Performance Measures: The utility and the net utility . It is clear to observe that the utility and the net utility of the benign agents dissipate with the increase of M . The total revenue of the OSN also increases with M . Hence, the benign agents who are not targeted by the malicious agent also suffers from the increases of his "enemies".
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we validate the proposed bounds through numerical simulations and reveal the important insights on the efficiency of adversarial timeline competition. Linear Utility Functions: We hereby compute the performance measures for a large number of random tests. In Fig.2∼8 , we consider the timeline competition among five benign agents (N = 5) and one malicious agent. X-coordinate denotes the willingness factor, and y-coordinate denotes different ratios respectively. Each marked point in these figures with a marker represents a corresponding ratio with randomly generated valuations from uniform distribution in [0 1] (some points are not plotted simply for reducing the size of image files). Fig.2 illustrates the upper and the lower bounds of
Umax . The malicious agent does not participate in the worst case of U mal when θ is less than 0.287. As θ further increases, the lower bound descends rapidly. Similarly, the malicious agent does not participate in the best case of U mal when θ is less than 0.8. A slight increase of θ beyond 0.8 leads to a rapid decrease of the upper bound. Thus, for the small willingness factor, we can deem that the efficiency loss in the total utility is mainly caused by the competition among the benign agents. The bounds of utility loss are very sensitive to the change of θ in certain ranges. Fig.3 compares the utilities at two NEs for the games MAL and NOM. The lower bound is shown to decrease rapidly even for very small θ. Fig.4 illustrates the upper and the lower bounds of
Vmax . The upper bound of the net utility is shown to be very sensitive to θ, especially when θ is small. This implies that the best net utility is not robust against the malicious actions. The lower bound is a fixed with small θ, but decreases when θ is above a certain threshold. This manifests that the loss of net utility is caused by the competition among the benign agents for small θ and by the malicious agent for large θ. The lower bound of V mal Vnom is shown in Fig.5 , which owns a similar property as the lower bound of U mal Unom in Fig.3 . As θ increases from 0, the lower bound decreases quickly. Wmax . When θ increases from 0, the lower bound increases accordingly. When θ is greater than 0.8, the malicious agent is bound to participate. It is interesting to see that the participation of the benign agent brings more revenues to the OSN. When θ is 3, the upper bound of the game MAL is nearly 20% higher than the best revenue in the game MAX. Fig.7 compares the revenue of the OSN at the NEs MAL and MAX. The revenue of the OSN in MAL is invariably no less than that in MAX. Especially, the maximum improvement in our simulation is more than 70% when θ is 3. In light of the benefits brought to the OSN, he may renounce the Fig.2 , the results of random tests are more convergent with N = 100. This implies that when there N is large, the utility loss of benign agents (or the damage caused by the malicious agent) is more predictable. Fig.9 characterizes the net utility of the malicious agent with imperfect targeted advertising. Here, N is 20 and M denotes the number of benign agents that are of the same type as the malicious agent. The valuations of benign agents are 1 uniformly. When M increases, i.e. the targeted advertising becoming more accurate, while the net utility of the benign agents decreases. Logarithmic Utility Functions: We evaluate the correctness of lower bounds for logarithmic utility functions in the form Umax of logarithmic utility functions is always above our mathematical bound. Similarly, the ratios of
Vnom are lowered bounded by the corresponding lower bounds for linear utility functions. Note that the upper bounds for linear utility functions do not apply to the scenarios for logarithmic utility functions.
VI. GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND DISCUSSIONS
General Applicability: The analytical results of this work can be further applied to investigate the competitive behavior in network security, resource allocation and rent-seeking issues. In DDoS attacks and defenses, we can deduce to what extent the congestion pricing can mitigate the harm to the aggregate utility and net utility of the finite number of benign users. In rent-seeking contest, our results can be used to analyze how the aggregate net utility of the benign contenders dissipates in the presence of a malicious contender. Our study can be used to analyze the competition of resources in servers or distributed clusters.
Discussions:
D1: The existence of multiple malicious agents. When there are multiple malicious agents with different willingness factors, the NE conditions manifest that only the one with the largest willingness factor participates in the timeline competition. Hence, we only need to consider the case of a single malicious agent. D2: The ordinary non-advertising messages on a viewer's timeline. Let the rate of generating non-advertising messages be y and z= N i=0 x i +y. When the advertising and nonadvertising messages are rigidly chronological on the timeline, the mean number of visible messages is still given by M i (x) = Kx i /z. The analysis of Nash equilibrium follows the same method, but the theoretical bounds should consider the rate of posting non-advertising messages. When the advertising messages are chronologically sorted in reserved locations of the timeline, the competition of advertising content is not influenced by the generation of non-advertising content. When the advertising content is delivered to a fraction of viewers' timelines based on their payments to the OSN, it does not compete for visibility with the non-advertising content. In these two scenarios, our models and analytical results hold automatically.
D3: The use of auction mechanism in timeline competition.
Auction theory has been widely applied to design the online advertising mechanism. The advertisements displayed in a webpage is determined by the bids submitted by the interested advertisers. In each time, one or more advertising spaces can be allocated. However, auction mechanism is not suitable to capture the competition for visibility through posting content with a reversely chronological order. Hence, we adopt the Tullock mechanism in which the visibility metrics are derived from queueing analysis on the timeline. In addition, Tullock mechanism has the similar form as all-pay auction. Hence, our analytical results may have a chance to apply to the all-pay auction in the presence of a malicious player.
D4: The competition for users' attention without complete information.
Our focus is to explore the fundamental efficiency of competition for users' attention in the presence of a malicious agent. Hence, similar to the literature [3] [5] [20] , we consider a complete information game. In reality, an agent is not aware of the utilities of his opponents when making the decision. Although complete information is not available, this agent observes his share of users' attention in each round. Then, he can learn the NE strategy according to the best response dynamics. As long as the utility function of each agent is not time-varying, the efficiency of competition does not change even if each agent cannot observe the utilities of all other agents.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work studies a novel malicious behavior against targeted advertising in the timeline of OSNs. A malicious agent can pay to the OSN to send commercial content to the timeline with the purpose of mitigating the utilities of all his opponents. We model their competition for visibility as a non-zero sum non-cooperative game and then investigate three performance measures: the total utility and the total net utility of benign agents as well as the OSN's revenue at the NE. We compute lower and upper bounds of these measures in the scenarios whether the malicious agent exists or not in the game. Our study reveals two significant effects of the malicious behavior. Firstly, there exist certain thresholds for the malicious agent's willingness factor upon which a slight increase in the willingness factor can reduce the utility and the net utility of benign agents remarkably. Secondly, the malicious agent always bring more revenue to the OSN. When the willingness factor is large, the OSN's revenue at the NE can be even greater than the maximum revenue he receives in the absence of the malicious agent.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS

Proof of Theorem 2
i). The first item can be derived directly from the participation condition of the malicious agent 
If v i > v j , there must have x * i > x * j . iii) For the last item, we prove it by contradiction. We assume x * j = 0 and x * i > 0 at the NE when the valuations of all the benign agents are identical. Then the expression (4) gives rise to
and 1
Because v i equals to v j , it is easy to conclude
which is not true. Thus, x * i must be positive for all the benign agents at the NE.
Proof of Theorem 3
We will show that the worst case occurs with linear utility functions of benign agents. Our proof follows the approach introduced by Johari and Tsitsiklis [3] . i). Consider an arbitrary strategyx and the social optimal strategy x S that yield the corresponding shares of viewers'
Therefore, we obtain a series of inequalities
. (26) We next derive two inequalities to simplify the above expression. Because d S i is a fraction with
is concave and strictly increasing with U Ai (0) = 0, we obtain that the expression
Let x * be the unique NE strategy, and d * be the vector of attention shares at this NE. We define a new class of linear utility functions as
If we letx = x * (alsod = d * accordingly), the denominator in the right-hand of Eq.(27) is the NE, and the nominator is actually the social optimal total net utility of benign agents. Therefore, we can see that the worst-case ratio
Vmax occurs in the case of linear utility functions.
Following the same approach, we can also find that the ratios
Unom and
Vnom take the minimum values upon which the utilities of benign agents are linear functions.
Proof of Theorem 4
We consider two cases at the NE separately, i.e. x * 0 = 0 and x * 0 > 0. Case 1: x * 0 = 0. When the malicious agent does not participate at the NE, there are at least two benign agents sending messages to the timeline. We assume that the top n benign agents participate at the NE. Then, the minimum total utility is the result of the following problem:
When A 0 does not participate, the NE conditions are expressed as
After some simple manipulations, there has
The utility of each A i is obtained by
We next show that U is a convex function over the vector of valuations {v i } n i=2 and the minimum is obtained at the boundary of the feasible region. The Hessian matrix of U is given by
Here, we omit the positive constant 3 and denote the Hessian matrix asĤ. Define two matricesĤ 1 andĤ 2 aŝ
whereĤ =Ĥ 1 −Ĥ 2 .Ĥ 1 is a full-rank diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the same, while the rank ofĤ 2 is only 1. Thus, the matrixĤ has m − 1 identical eigenvalue which is
vi . The last unknown eigenvalue is computed as
and we validate it as the following. Define a new matrix aŝ H 3 that haŝ
For each column j(j ≥ 2), we multiply it by vj+1 v2 and add to column 1. Then, column 1 becomes a zero vector, which validates the existence of an eigenvalue to be 1 v1 . All the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix H are positive which means that H is strictly positive definite. Hence, U is a convex function so that it is maximized at the point v i = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the maximum value is 1 (i.e. U max = 1).
Because U is strictly convex over the set of valuations {v i } n i=2 , the minimum utility U is chosen at the point that has ∂U ∂vi = 0 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n if they exist. By letting the first-order derivatives be 0, we obtain the optimal valuation v * i
Submitting Eq. (34) to (33), we obtain the lowest total utility of benign agents by
To find the monotonicity between U and n, we assume that n is a continuous variable. We take the derivative of U over n and obtain
Given N benign agents competing for the viewers' attention, the minimum total utility is obtained by
The total message rate of the benign agents at this NE is computed as
Since the malicious agent does not participate, the following inequality holds
according to the NE conditions in (5) . As N approaches infinity, the asymptotic total utility is given by
To enforce x * 0 = 0, θ can not exceed the corresponding threshold,
Case 2: x * 0 > 0. The NE conditions result in the following equations
Summing the above equations together, we have
and
Denote by v the minimum valuation of A 2 untill A n . Here, v must guarantee that these agents send messages to the timeline with positive rates. Thus, the worst total utility of benign agents is expressed as
The NE condition in (5) requires
The above inequality gives rise to
Submitting inequality (48) to (46) we obtain
The set of valuations {v i } N i=2 to minimize U are not unique. For instance, U is minimized in the scenario where only two players, A 0 and A 1 , participate in the timeline competition at the NE.
Proof of Theorem 5
This theorem compares the NEs of two games, G A and G B : the first one excludes the malicious agent, while the second one considers the possible participation of the malicious agent. We suppose that the participation of n A benign agents at the NE in the former and the participation of n B benign agents at the NE in the latter, given the set of valuations {v i } N i=1 . In these two games, n A and n B might not be the same. We prove this theorem via four steps.
Step 1: Proving n A ≥ n B . When the malicious agent participates, the number of benign agents that send messages with positive rates may decrease. This step can be easily proven by contradiction from the NE conditions.
Step 2: Approximating the ratio of two utilities. The ratio
Unom is computed by
According to the NE conditions of the game G B , since there are n B benign agents participating in the competition, we have
For any n with n > n B , the following inequality holds
due to x * i = 0. Hence, for n A and n B with n A ≥ n B , we obtain
Submitting (54) to (50), we derive the approximated lower bound by
Note that the NE of the game G A must involve two benign agents. Eq.(55) serves as a lower bound for n A ≥ 2. When only A 1 participates in the NE of the game G B , the utility of A 1 is given by U mal = 1 1+θ . The total utility of benign agents at the NE of the game G A is no larger than 1. In this scenario, Eq.(55) still holds at n A = 1. Therefore, Eq.(55) captures the lower bound of
Unom for any n A ∈ [1, N ]. We drop all the subscripts and obtain
We let ∆ denote the expression
vi . The derivative of the right-hand of Eq.(56) over ∆ yields
where the equality holds only with n = 1. Therefore, the lower bound of
Step 3: Finding the maximum of the expression
The equality holds only when all v n are the same. Hence, ∆ is a decreasing function of v n . The maximum ∆ is obtained at the point that v n reduces to its minimum value. When v n further decreases, A n will not participate in the timeline competition.
For ease of notation, we denote v as the minimum value for
We next analyze the optimal selection of v i for 2 ≤ i ≤ (n−1). By taking the first and the second-order derivatives, we obtain the following equations
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ (n−1). By letting d∆ dvi = 0, we can obtain a set of {v i } n i=2 to reach the extremum of ∆. However, their second-order derivatives are strictly positive. This means that the maximum of ∆ is not reached at these {v i } n i=2 , but at the boundaries, i.e. v i = 1 or v i = v for all 2 ≤ i ≤ (n−1).
We suppose v i = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and v i = v for k+1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, there yields
Given n and √ v, we find that the maximum ∆ is obtained at k = Case i): n is an even number. Here, v is reached at the boundary that A n sends messages with an arbitrarily small rate, i.e. x * n is infinitely approaching 0. The NE conditions result in the following equations
The above equations solve v by
The maximum ∆ is thus computed as
Case ii): n is an odd number and k = ⌊ n 2 ⌋. Eq.(63) gives rise to
Hence, v is given by
Case iii): n is an odd number and k = ⌈ n 2 ⌉. Following the same technique, we have
Obviously, ∆ is a decreasing function of v according to Eq.(62). Therefore, we only consider Case i) and Case ii) to compute the lower bound of
The maximum ∆ at the case of odd n is given by
. (69) Step 4: Analyzing the lower bound of
. We consider the two cases with regard to n in Step 3 separately.
Case i): n is an even number. Submitting Eq.(65) to Eq.(58), we obtain the following inequality
Then, there exists
where n is no less than 2. Hence, the lower bound of
Case ii): n is an odd number and k = ⌊ n 2 ⌋. Submitting Eq.(67) to Eq.(58), the lower bound of
Then, we derive the following inequality
Therefore, the lower bound of
Unom is formally given by
where it is tight for n = 1.
Proof of Theorem 6
First of all, the social optimal net utility V max approaches 1 asymptotically since U max is 1. We suppose x * i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x * i = 0 for n+1 ≤ i ≤ N at the NE. Similar to the preceding proof, two cases, x * 0 = 0 and x * 0 > 0, are considered. Case 1: x * 0 = 0. The total net utility of benign agents is obtained by
As proved before, U(d * ) is a strictly convex function over the set of valuations
is minimized at its unique interior point if it exists at the feasible region. We differentiate V(d * ) over v i (2 ≤ i ≤ n) and obtain
If there exists a feasible solution to
with the participation of n benign agents. Due to the symmetric property of Eq.(77), all v i (2 ≤ i ≤ n) are the same when minimizing V(d * ). Hence, we can easily obtain
Submitting Eq. (78) to (76), we obtain
The total rate of messages generated by benign agents at the NE is computed as
To enforce x * 0 = 0 at this NE, the willingness factor θ should satisfy
according to the expression (5). We next compare V(d * ) for different n ∈ [2, N ]. Suppose that n is a continuous variable. We differentiate V(d * ) over n and get dV(d * ) dn < 0. Therefore, the worst total net utility of benign agents is obtained when all of them participate at the NE. The minimum total net utility is given by
The total net utility of benign agents is expressed in the following equation
We differentiate V(d * ) over v i and obtain
From Eqs. (84) and (85) the identical valuation of the benign agents except A 1 at this interior point. By letting the derivative dV dvi be 0, we obtain the following equation
where
is the feasible solution. Note that the minimum might take values at the boundary if the interior point is outside of the feasible region. Thus, we need to examine the possible scenarios where the valuations of some benign agents are chosen at the boundary. i) v * i = 1 and 0 < v * j < 1 for 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We will show that this scenario does not happen. ii) v * i = 0 and 0 < v * j < 1 for 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. In this scenario, A i does not send messages. It is equivalent to the situation that n−1 benign agents participate in the timeline competition. Thus, the interior point leads to the minimum V(d * ) for fixed n.
The interior point results in the minimum V given that the top n benign agents send messages with positive rates at the NE. However, it might not lead to the global minimum, i.e. the minimum for each n ∈ [1, N ]. We need to compare the minimum V(d * ) for each different n. Naturally, the minimum V(d * ) is any n is formally given by
is the solution to Eq.(86) in (0, 1).
Proof of Theorem 7
Consider two games, G A and G B : the former excludes the malicious agent, the latter considers the possible participation of the malicious agent. Suppose that n A benign agents participate in G A at the NE and n B participate in G B at the NE. It is easy to prove by contradiction to show n A ≥ n B .
Knowing from the proof of Theorem 6 and Theorem 9, we have
for the game G A . For the game G B , there exist
if the malicious agent participates at the NE, and V mal = V nom if it does not participate at the NE. We then prove this theorem via three steps.
Step 1: Proving
According to the NE conditions, there must have
Otherwise, the number of benign agents participating at the NE will be less than n A . Denote by
We prove by induction that Φ(n) decreases w.r.t. n (2 ≤ n ≤ n A ).
i) For n = 2, there have Φ(1) = 1 and Φ(2) = 1+v 2 − 3v2 1+v2 . We subtract Φ(2) from Φ(1) and obtain
. We expand the expression of Φ(k) and Φ(k − 1) and obtain
iii) For n = k + 1, we subtract Φ(k) from Φ(k + 1). There has
The denominator of Eq.(92) can be easily shown to be strictly convex on v k+1 . When v k takes the value
, there has Φ(k) − Φ(k−1) = 0. When v k+1 takes the value v k , the denominator equals to that of Eq.(91), which is less than 0. Therefore, we can conclude Φ(n) ≤ Φ(n − 1) for all 2 ≤ n ≤ n A .
Step 2: Approximating the ratio of two net utilities. The ratio
Vnom can be lower bounded by
for n B ≥ 2 due to the analysis in Step 1. For the special case n B = 1, the denominator is 1, the maximum achievable total net utility. Therefore, the lower bound of
Vnom can be expressed as Eq.(93) for n B ≥ 1. For the sake of convenience, we omit the subscript in the variable n B .
Step 3: Computing the lower bound of
The lower bound can be simplified as
We differentiate the right-hand expression of Eq.(94) over ∆ and find that the derivative is positive. This means that the minimum of the right-hand expression is obtained when ∆ is minimized. Since the minimum ∆ is n 2 obtained at v i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the lower bound of the ratio
The expression n 2 (1+nθ) 2 is strictly increasing w.r.t. n. We finally conclude the worst case of the ratio as
(96)
Proof of Theorem 8
Similarly, we consider two cases separately, x * 0 = 0 and x * 0 > 0. Note that the utility functions of all the benign agents are linear. Case 1: x * 0 = 0. It is very direct to validate that the maximum total utility is 1. For instance, when v i is equal to 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the total utility is maximized. However, the set of valuations {v i } that lead to this maximum are not unique. We hereby want to find the condition to enforce x * 0 = 0. Suppose that n benign agents participate in the timeline competition at the NE. For an arbitrary set of valuations {v i } n i=2 , the NE conditions yield
for x * 0 = 0. It is easy to validate from our preceding proof that x * i increases with v i . At the same time, when more benign agents participate at the NE, the total rate of sending messages increases accordingly. Hence, x * 0 = 0 is no longer true when there has θ ≤ 
Combining the analyses in two cases together, we prove this theorem.
Analysis of Corollary 1
Consider two games, G A and G B : the former excludes the malicious agent, the latter considers the possible participation of the malicious agent. Suppose that n A benign agents participate in G A at the NE and n B participate in G B at the NE.
When the malicious agent does not participate at the NE of G B , both NEs are the same so that the ratio U mal Unom is 1. When θ is greater than N −1 N , the malicious agent will participate for sure. In this scenario, it is difficult to compute the upper bound of
Unom . The reason is that
Unom with n A = n B does not necessarily constitute an upper bound for each n. Hence, we only aim to find an approximated upper bound for U mal Unom . i). We first consider the case that θ is slightly larger than
N , the maximum total utility is obtained when the valuations of the participating agents are 1 uniformly. When θ is slightly larger than
N , the number of the benign agents that participate in the game G B will not change. Because U mal is an increasing function of the valuations, the maximum U mal is obtained by n 1+nθ where n is the number of the benign agents that participate. Then, the upper bound of the ratio
Following the proof of Theorem 5, the minimum of the expression
The lower bound of
Unom can be further simplified as
ii) We next consider the case that θ is large enough. In the game G B , n B might be larger if the valuations of the benign agents increase. The highest improvement takes place when n B increases from 1 to 2. However, W mal only increases from 1 1+θ to 2 2+θ , which is very small for some large θ. In the game G A , the minimum U nom is given by Eq.(8) in Theorem 4. The minimum is achieved when all the benign agents participate in the timeline competition at the NE. The valuations of A 2 to A N are N (N − 1) − (N − 1) uniformly. When v 2 increases to 1, U nom improves significantly. Hence, when θ is large enough, the approximated upper bound of
Unom takes place at n B = 1 and n A = N where the minimum U nom is reached. Then, the approximated upper bound is given by
Combing the above two cases together, we obtain the approximated upper bound for the ratio
Proof of Theorem 9
We suppose that x * i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x * i = 0 for n+1 ≤ i ≤ N at the NE. The optimal total net utility is found for each n in the first step. We then compare the optimal total net utilities among all the possible n. Two cases are considered, x * 0 = 0 or x * 0 > 0 (i.e. whether the malicious agent sends messages to the timeline or not). Case 1: x * 0 = 0. The total net utility of benign agents is given by
According to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 4, V(d * ) is a strictly convex function so that the maximum V(d * ) is obtain at the boundary of the feasible region, i.e. v i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In other words, there has max V(d * ) = 1 n . This maximum is achieved under the condition θ < n−1 n such that the malicious agent A 0 does not participate. Case 2: x * 0 > 0. The total net utility of benign agents is given in Eq.(83). The proof of Theorem 6 manifests that there exists a unique local minimum. The maximum total net utility should be obtained at the boundary. Here, we only consider the right boundary, i.e. v i = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, because the left boundary corresponds to the participation of less than n benign agents. Then, the maximum total net utility is obtained by
In order to guarantee x * 0 > 0 at the NE, the willingness factor θ must satisfy θ ≥ n−1 n . We then proceed to find the maximum V(d * ) for all n ∈ [1, N ] that satisfies the corresponding condition θ ≥ n−1 n .
Let n 1 and n 2 be two different integers in the set [1, N ] . We compare the total net utilities at these two different scenarios.
By endowing n 1 and n 2 different values, we obtain -V(d The participation of A 0 at the NE always generates a better upper bound of the total net utility of benign agents than that in the absence of A 0 . Therefore, we only need to compare three outcomes, 
Proof of Theorem 10
Note that W max is the maximum revenue obtained by the OSN excluding the player A 0 . The NE conditions yield
when the top n benign agents and the malicious agent participate at the NE; they also give rise to
when the malicious agent does not participate. It is clear to observe that W mal is a decreasing function for any v i (2 ≤ i ≤ n). When the malicious agent is excluded, the revenue of the OSN is given by
where n is determined by {v i } N i=2 . Similarly, Eq. (107) is also a decreasing function of any v i (2 ≤ i ≤ n). By enumerating all the possible n, we can see
Step 1: Proving the lower bound. Eq.(105) and (106) both show that W mal is the decreasing function of any v i (2 ≤ i ≤ n). Thus, when the minimum W mal is obtained, all the benign agents from A 2 to A n have the same lowest valuation denoted by v. However, we need to find v for each case,
Since 2θ 1+θ is less than 2, it is easy to validate that v A is always greater than v B . Our previous analysis has shown that the revenue of the OSN is a decreasing function of v no matter whether the malicious agent participate or not. Therefore, the minimum revenue should be obtained in the case x * 0 > 0. To summarize, we have the following lower bound
Step 2: Proving the upper bound. If the malicious agent does not participate at the NE, the maximum achievable revenue of the OSN is the same as W max . On the contrary, if the malicious agent participates at the NE, the maximum W mal is obtained by
Then, the upper bound is
Proof of Theorem 11
Note that W mal is the same as W nom if the malicious agent does not participate at the NE. Hence, we only consider the scenario with the participation of the malicious agent. Similar to the proceeding proofs, we denote G A as the game excluding the malicious agent, and G B as that with the possible participation of the malicious agent. Suppose that n A benign agents send messages with positive rates at the NE of G A and n B benign agents do so at the NE of G B . Then, there exists n A ≥ n B . The ratio
According to the inequality (54), this ratio has the following bound
where the subscripts on the variable n are removed. It is intuitive to see that v i (∀i ≥ 2) should be as large as possible at the right-hand of Eq.(125). For the given θ, v i should be chosen to allow the participation of the malicious agent. Therefore, according to the NE conditions, the maximum ratio is obtained by {v i } n i=2 chosen from θ
The above equality gives rise to
Submitting inequality (127) to (125), we obtain the lower bound
Wnom ≥ 1. The upper bound can be solved directly. Consider a scenario with v 2 = ǫ and v i = 0 for all i ≥ 3. The total revenue of the OSN is small enough with the asymptotic bound W nom = 0. For any given θ and the participation of the malicious agent at the NE, the total revenue is finite. Therefore, the ratio has the property W mal Wnom ∝ ∞ which means that it is unbounded.
